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Abstract
We study the e￿ect of taxation on entrepreneurship, taking into account both the
amount of entry and the quality of new ventures. We show that even with risk neutral
agents and no tax evasion progressive taxes can increase entrepreneurial entry, while
reducing average ￿rm quality. So called \success taxes" increase startup of lower value
business ideas by reducing the option value of pursuing better projects. This suggests
that the most common measure used in the literature, the likelihood of entry into
self-employment, may underestimate the adverse e￿ect of taxation.
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11 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is generally viewed as an important determinant of innovation and growth.
For this reason public policy has focused on entrepreneurial activity and on the organiza-
tional form in which it often takes place; self-employment. One of the main components of
entrepreneurial public policy in all developed countries is the taxation of the self-employed.
However, the impact of taxation on entrepreneurial activity is not very clear. The empirical
evidence for the impact of taxation on the level of entrepreneurship is generally inconclusive
(Bruce and Schuetze 2004). One reason is that entrepreneurship is a somewhat vague con-
cept, hard to exactly de￿ne and harder yet to measure. Another reason is that the theory
on the relationship between taxation and entrepreneurship is ambiguous.
There are at least four ways in which taxation can a￿ect entrepreneurial entry (Bruce
and Gurley 2004). Most straight-forward, the e￿ect of taxes is to lower returns from e￿ort
and risk taking; personal taxes on entrepreneurs are bound to reduce investments, hiring
and ￿rm growth (Carroll et al. 2000a, 2000b, 2001). On the other hand, taxes can stimulate
risk taking activities by compressing the distribution of after-tax returns, at least for the
marginal investment, when losses are fully deductible (Domar and Musgrave 1944). Taxes
can also increase self-employment if entrepreneurs face lower taxes than employees or if self-
employment make it easier to evade taxes (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1991, 1994; Gordon
1998; Bruce 2000; Cullen and Gordon 2002, Stenkula 2009).
Since entrepreneurial returns are more dispersed than wages, the progressivity of the tax
schedule matters as well as the level of taxation. In an in￿uential paper Gentry and Hubbard
(2000) demonstrate that high marginal tax rates discourage entry into self-employment. The
result that these \success taxes" discourage entrepreneurial entry is consistent with the risk-
sharing framework of Domar and Musgrave (1944), since high marginal taxes enhance the
2asymmetry in a tax system where losses below bankruptcy level are not tax-credited.
The policy interest in taxes is not only in the number of self-employed but also in the value
of the ￿rms they create. Previous research however has focused only on the e￿ect of taxes
on the quantity of entrepreneurship, such as the share of entrepreneurs (or self-employed)
or the probability that an individual enters entrepreneurship. However another interesting
margin in terms of social and private value is the quality of the entrepreneurial ￿rms. This
depends on the importance of the innovation and of the class of the entrepreneur, and can
also be a function of entrepreneurial e￿ort. Clearly not all ￿rms are equally successful or
contribute equally to the general welfare of society.
In this paper we analyze the e￿ect of taxes jointly on quality and quantity of entrepreneur-
ship; we use a dynamic forward-looking framework where individuals decide to create ￿rms
by taking into account all future utilities and options. In various speci￿cations we include
progressive and proportional taxes, the relative tax rate on workers and the self-employed,
the choice of e￿ort given entry, and the importance of commitment to any given startup. Our
results indicate that in a dynamic setting with a high level of commitment progressive taxes
can increase entry into self-employment, while reducing average quality of the ￿rm. These
￿ndings are in contrast to the theoretical prediction of success taxes on entrepreneurship
from Gentry and Hubbard (2000). The source of potential increase in self-employment due
to taxes is also novel. It happens not through risk smoothing or tax evasion, but because
progressive taxes reduce the alternative cost of pursuing a mediocre business idea rather than
searching for a better one. If the start-up decision requires commitment and is associated
with an alternative search cost for other (better) business ideas waiting has an option value1.
Progressive taxes reduce this option value by disproportionately taxing the most successful
￿rms. One implication of these results is that empirical investigation of the e￿ect of taxation
1We abstract from the possibility that the worker might sell his/her entrepreneurial idea.
3on self-employment can underestimate the distortionary e￿ects of progressive taxes if (as is
generally the case) only the quantity but not the quality of self-employment is studied.
Our results have parallels in the theory of equilibrium unemployment (Pissarides 1990;
Ljungqvist and Sargent 1995) and in the investment under uncertainty literature (Dixit and
Pindyck 1994). With risk and irreversible investments the issue of timing becomes important.
There is an option value of waiting for better market prospects, similar to the entrepreneur in
our model that can wait for a business idea with higher potential. While entrepreneurial entry
is not touched upon by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Panteghini (2007) uses this framework
to analyze entrepreneurial investment decisions in a recursive setting, with the ￿rm payo￿
follows a Brownian motion. The e￿ect of progressive taxes on the quantity and quality of
entry in our model are thus more broadly interpretable than entrepreneurial entry, and apply
to any situation where investment now implies an alternative cost in terms of investment in
the future.
2 Quality and Quantity of Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship is a multifaceted phenomenon, distinct from other economic activities with
respect to aspects such as risk, its dynamic nature (Schumpeter 1934), uncertainty (Knight
1921), alertness to change (Kirzner 1967) and managerial talent (Lucas 1978). The mul-
tiple aspects that distinguish entrepreneurship in general and the e￿ects of taxation on
entrepreneurial activity in particular have been proved di￿cult to capture with any one
economic model (Henrekson and Sanandaji 2011). To the extent neoclassical economists
have successfully modeled entrepreneurship they have highlighted a few of entrepreneurial
characteristic in any single models, aware that this does not constitute a complete model
of entrepreneurship (Lucas 1978; Kihlstrom et al. 1979; Kanbur 1982; Aghion and Howitt
41992; Cagetti and De Nardi 2006). Our focus will be on the e￿ect of taxes on the timing
of entry and how this impacts the total amount of self-employment and the average quality
of the entrepreneurial ￿rm. The potential entrepreneur decides whether to start a ￿rm with
a given entrepreneurial innovation or business idea or to remain employed and search for a
new idea. Arguably the most important role entrepreneurs assume in the economy is that
of innovators which is a motivation for our focus on the quality of the business idea. The
quality of the ￿rm also depends on the entrepreneurial e￿ort exerted given startup which we
will examine separately.
The ￿rst important decision any prospective entrepreneur has to make is whether to start
a ￿rm or work for someone else. In our model each period the individual discovers an \en-
trepreneurial idea"; he then decides whether to use it to start a ￿rm or to continue searching
while remaining employed. The values of these innovations or business ideas di￿er, which
represents the quality of entrepreneurship in our model. If the prospective entrepreneur does
not act on the idea in a certain period it is assumed to be lost, re￿ecting the role of the
entrepreneur as reacting to business opportunity in changing markets. Once a person decides
to start a ￿rm he will earn pro￿ts that depend on the quality of the business idea. The share
of workers that decide to start ￿rms represents the quantity of entrepreneurship.
Quality can be thought of as representing the social value created by the ￿rm. This can
be through new technological innovations, new or improved goods or a more e￿cient ways of
producing existing products. What is central is the recognition that entrepreneurial ventures
di￿er in value generated for society. Identifying a market niche and opening a new restaurant
in a neighborhood can be valuable entrepreneurship, but not as valuable as creating new
concept that that leads to an entire chain of restaurants. From the perspective of policy
makers it is not only important how many people become entrepreneurs. It also matters
5that these individual pursue the best possible ideas, exert high e￿ort, bring together factors
needed for successful ventures and create fast growing ￿rms that create as many jobs and as
much consumer surplus as possible. A proxy for entrepreneurial quality is the market value of
the ￿rm that they create2. Policymakers who wish to encourage entrepreneurship are seeking
both quantity and quality. One \Google" is worth thousands of smaller entrepreneurial ￿rms
in terms of jobs, added value to gross domestic product or most other economic metrics of
entrepreneurship.
We assume initially that the entrepreneur cannot search for new business ideas while man-
aging his ￿rms; this is the alternative cost of pursuing one project. In the Appendix we relax
this assumption and discuss how our results change. For simplicity we abstract from learning
by doing: ideas cannot be improved upon once the project is pursued. Entrepreneurial ideas
are not correlated over time. We also abstract from any general equilibrium considerations;
in particular workers’ wages are not determined in equilibrium but are given. This is not
unreasonable as the entrepreneurial sector in most western economies is small and thus un-
likely to a￿ect equilibrium wages through the supply of labor (although the e￿ect on the
demand of labor can be much more important). Lastly the behavior of other entrepreneurs
does not change the returns faced by other potential entrants 3.
People who choose not to enter entrepreneurship and search for better ideas will earn
a ￿xed wage and receive another entrepreneurial idea next period. Each period a certain
fraction of entrepreneurs fails or quits and returns to the pool of workers. The wage rate
2Admittedly this proxy is not faultless since, for example, markets are not perfect and not all consumer
surplus is captured. It is however in our opinion a good ￿rst approximation.
3There is a theoretical justi￿cation for this assumption. Entrepreneurship is innovative in nature, and
can open up new markets and opportunities for other entrepreneurs. For this reason, and in contrast to
other factors of production, a higher level of preexisting entrepreneurship does not necessarily diminish the
marginal return for other entrepreneurs (Henrekson 2007).
6is the same for all and can be interpreted as the relative advantage of employment vs. self
employment. Crucially, the value of remaining as worker is the sum of wage income and the
discounted option value of possibly discovering a better entrepreneurial idea in the future.
2.1 The Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of in￿nitely lived agents of measure one. Each
individual maximizes the discounted value of his life time utility,
P
￿
tu(ct), where ct denotes
consumption in period t and ￿ is the discount factor; ￿ is strictly greater than zero and
smaller than one. We will not analyze savings decision and further assume that agents are
risk neutral. The utility function has the form u(ct) = ct, so that the problem facing the agent
is to maximize the discounted value of consumption at present. Because of risk neutrality the
Domar and Musgrave (1944) style variation smoothing e￿ect of taxes on marginal investment
are not included in the model, and are therefore not a driving mechanism for the results.
At the beginning of each period every individual receives an exogenous entrepreneurial
idea, ￿, drawn from a generic distribution, F(￿), de￿ned over the positive interval [￿l;￿h].
Upon observing the value of ￿ the agent chooses between working on the market for wage w
while looking for a better entrepreneurial idea or using the business idea to start a ￿rm and
earn the pro￿t generated. Entrepreneurs receive the pro￿ts made by their ￿rm, Y e
t = f(￿t);
in our simpli￿ed economy Y e
t = ￿t:The value of the entrepreneurial idea, ￿t, is identically and
independently distributed over time. Because there is no capital nor savings in the model
ct = w for workers and ct = ￿t for entrepreneurs.
2.2 Equilibrium
The problem can be written in a recursive form:
7V (￿) = maxfV
e(￿);V
s(￿)g
where V s(￿) is the value function for the worker, and V e(￿) is the value function for the
entrepreneur. These value functions can be expressed as follows:
V





e(￿) = ￿ + ￿ [pV
s(￿) + (1 ￿ p)V
e(￿)] (2)
In formula (1) the integral value on the right hand side (RHS) is the discounted option
value of waiting one more period and drawing one more time from the distribution of en-
trepreneurial ideas. Since ￿ is independently distributed over time this value is constant.
This implies that V s(￿) is constant with respect to ￿.
The value function for the entrepreneur is the discounted value of the pro￿t earned in
the current period and of the pro￿ts earned in future periods, if the entrepreneurial acivity
continues. With probability p in fact the entrepreneur might be forced out of business and
into the salaried-workers segment of the economy. As dependent worker however he might
still be looking for a new entrepreneurial idea to create a new ￿rm. The value function for




1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)
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￿p
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)
V
s(￿) (3)
notice that V e(￿) is strictly increasing (linear) in ￿.
We de￿ne ￿
￿ as the \reservation entrepreneurial idea". It represents the level of en-
trepreneurial idea such that below it the agent will ￿nd it optimal to work in the market;
for every idea above this level the agent will prefer to start a ￿rm and earn a pro￿t. In
particular ￿
￿ is de￿ned as
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Using the reservation value, ￿
￿; and (3) we can rewrite (1) as:
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1￿￿(1￿p): In the appendix we discuss the conditions required for the existence
and uniqueness of this equilibrium.
The partial equlibrium model outlined above has certain useful features that will allow
us to capture important determinants of entrepreneurial entry. This is not to deny some
limitations, such as not taking into account the e￿ects of entrepreneurs’ decisions on the
rest of the economy. As we explained above this is a smaller problem if the entrepreneurial
sector is small with respect to the rest of the economy in the mechanism investigated, such
as the supply of workers (entrepreneurs probably have a more important role in determining
productivity growth and the demand for labour). One could expand the model with an
additional sector, such as a traditional corporate sector, and set the wage equal to the
marginal product of that sector. The agent will then have to allocate labor between the two
9sectors and this will determine an equilibrium value for the wage. We do not think that
this would add much to the intuition contained in the following sections, especially since the
self-employed (of which only some are truly entrepreneurial ￿rms) constitute no more than
around one tenth of all workers in the United States and most advanced countries.
3 Taxation and Entrepreneurial Entry
This section investigates the e￿ect of taxation on the decision of starting a ￿rm. We consider
proportional and progressive taxes on business and labor income. Taxes on the self-employed
should be interpreted as the e￿ective personal tax rate of the proprietor from all income from
business activity. Likewise, personal taxes should be broadly interpreted.
A ￿rst result is that proportional taxes do not a￿ect entrepreneurial entry if the tax rates
on business and capital income are equal (since other margins such as leisure are excluded).
Our main result is that progressive taxes do have an e￿ect on entrepreneurial entry even when
the labor and business tax schedules are identical. In particular progressive tax schedules
that decrease the workers’ option value of waiting for a better idea result in a decline in
the average quality of entrepreneurial ￿rms accompanied by a reduction in the wait time to
enter entrepreneurship, which increases the number of entrepreneurs in the economy.
3.1 Proportional Taxation
Let’s call the proportional tax rate applied to business income ￿￿ and the proportional tax
rate applied to labor income ￿w. The value functions (3) and (5) become
V
s(￿) =
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)
1 ￿ ￿


















￿ is de￿ned analogously to ￿
￿ by:
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￿)] (9)
From (9) we immediately derive the two following propositions.
Proposition 1 If ￿w = ￿￿ = ￿ then ￿
￿




business and labor income are subject to proportional taxation and the tax rates are identical,
the equilibrium in the economy is the same as in the case with no taxes.
Proof. The result follows immediately from (9). When ￿w = ￿￿ = ￿ equation (9)
simpli￿es to equation (6).
Proposition 2 With proportional taxation when the tax rate on wages is higher than the tax
rate on business income there will be more entrepreneurial entry in equilibrium. Moreover,
an increase in the tax rate on wages decreases further the threshold level for entrepreneurial
entry. Similarly, when the tax rate on business income is higher than the tax rate on wages
there will be less entrepreneurial entry in equilibrium. Moreover, an increase in the tax rate
on business income will increase further the threshold level for entrepreneurial entry.
Proof. See Appendix.
Obviously when the tax rate on business income is higher than the tax rate on wages there
will be less entrepreneurial entry and fewer entrepreneurs in equilibrium than when the tax
rates are the same. The opposite is true when the tax rate on business income is lower that
the tax rate on wages. The previous proposition also suggest that an increase in the tax rate
11on wages will increase entrepreneurial entry in the economy, while an increase in business
income tax rates will decrease entrepreneurship. Notice moreover that in this model, an
increase in entrepreneurial entry is associated with a decrease in the average quality of the
￿rms since the individuals who are entering entrepreneurship are the marginal ones, those
whose entrepreneurial ideas are of worse quality than the existing ￿rms. The opposite is
true when entrepreneurial entry decreases. A decrease in the number of entrepreneurs in the
economy is associated to an increase in the average quality of the ￿rm.
3.2 Progressive Taxation
Let us now consider the e￿ect of a progressive tax schedule. Consider a simple progressive
structure for taxation and call Tw the progressive schedule for labor income and T￿ the
progressive schedule for business income. Higher levels of income will be taxed with higher
tax rates. In particular
Tw = 0 w < ^ w (10)
= ￿w w ￿ ^ w
T￿ = 0 ￿ < ^ ￿ (11)
= ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿
where ￿w > 0, and ￿￿ > 0. To further simplify the problem and allow us to make some
interesting comparisons, let’s assume that ￿w = ￿￿ = ￿ and ^ ￿ = ^ w. The tax schedules are
the same for labor and business income. We illustrate now di￿erent cases that may arise
depending on the shape of the tax schedule, i.e. the relative position of ^ ￿, ￿
￿ and w. Figure
1 illustrates graphically the equilibrium point ￿
￿ when ￿
￿ < ^ ￿.
123.2.1 Case 1: ^ ￿ > ￿
￿
In this case the value functions can be written as
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￿ [1 + ￿p ￿ ￿F(￿
￿
￿)] (14)
In this case the e￿ect of an increase in the tax rate is summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 With a progressive tax schedule when the marginal entrepreneur earns less
than the top marginal tax rate bracket, an increase in the top marginal tax rate causes a
decrease in the reservation entrepreneurial idea, hence an increase in entrepreneurial entry
and a decrease in the average quality of the ￿rms in the economy.
Proof. See Appendix.
The previous proposition states that even if business income and wages are taxed at
the same level, the \reservation entrepreneurial idea" in this case is lower than in the case
with no taxes or equal proportional tax rates for business and wage incomes. Two identical
economies, one with a progressive tax schedule with equal marginal rates on business and
wage incomes and one with a proportional tax schedule with equal marginal rates on busi-
ness and wage incomes, will have di￿erent levels of entrepreneurial activity. In particular the
13former will have more entrepreneurs but the average quality of the ￿rm will be lower. More-
over, as the top marginal rate increases more agents will choose to become entrepreneurs
and the lower the average quality of entrepreneurial ￿rms.
The intuition behind this result is that convex taxes disproportionally decrease option
value of working and searching for new ideas. Since the most successful businesses will be
taxed at a higher rate the incentive to wait for better entrepreneurial ideas are diminished.
Some workers with medium value ideas prefer to start a ￿rm, and thus give up the chance
of waiting and ￿nding a better idea. Figure 2 illustrates graphically this mechanism.
Waiting for an entrepreneurial idea can be viewed as a form of passive search. In that
case our model predicts that an increase in the convexity of the tax schedule can decrease
search activity and make people more likely to hold on to their current occupation. Gentry
and Hubbard (2004) empirically demonstrate that tax progressivity decreases job turnover.
3.2.2 Case 2: ￿
￿ > ^ ￿ > w














￿ ￿ ^ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)
[1 + ￿p ￿ ￿F(￿
￿
￿)] (15)
The e￿ect of a top marginal tax rate increase in this case is summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 With a progressive tax schedule when the marginal entrepreneur earns more
than the top marginal tax rate bracket and more than the average worker, the e￿ect of an
increase in the top marginal tax rate on entrepreneurial activity is uncertain.
Proof. See Appendix.
14The e￿ect of an increase of the top marginal rate on entrepreneurial activity is uncertain
when the marginal entrepreneur is in the top bracket (i.e. the bracket at which the change is
occurring). The reason is that there are two e￿ects that work in opposite directions. First,
there is the decrease in the value of being a worker due to the decrease in the option value of
searching for a better idea, as described in the previous section. Second, there is a decrease
in the value of being a (successful) entrepreneur due to an increase in the share of income
taxed away by the government.
Let us ignore for now the e￿ect on the option value of being a worker and only look at
the direct e￿ect of an increased tax rate on the marginal entrepreneur. For entrepreneurs in
the top tax bracket, an increase in the marginal tax rate they face (from ￿ to ￿0) decreases
the value of being an entrepreneur vis-a-vis the value of working. Since this is true for all
the ideas above ^ ￿, it also holds for the marginal entrepreneur earning a pre-tax pro￿t equal
to ￿
￿
￿ > ^ ￿. However the marginal entrepreneur was by de￿nition indi￿erent between salaried
work and entrepreneurship when the tax rate was ￿: Since the tax rate has now increased,
the after-tax pro￿t is lower and the former marginal entrepreneur is no longer indi￿erent
between being an entrepreneur and a worker. Instead he or she strictly prefers being a
worker.
In other words, since taxes have increased the pre-tax pro￿t that an entrepreneur needs
to earn in order to be indi￿erent between working and starting a ￿rm has to go up. Because
of the decrease in after tax pro￿ts, the reservation entrepreneurial idea must increase follow-
ing an increase in the top marginal tax rate for the agent to remain indi￿erent. Figure 3
illustrates this e￿ect on ￿
￿.
Since this e￿ect and the e￿ect on the search option go in opposite directions the overall
impact of an increase in the top marginal tax rate on entrepreneurial activity cannot be
15determined without further assumptions on the distribution of the thetas and the relative
positions of ￿
￿ and ^ ￿:
3.2.3 Case 3: ￿
￿ > w > ^ ￿
We consider the case in which labor income is taxed. As in the previous section we consider
the case in which the kink in the entrepreneurial value function is below the value of searching.
The situation when it is above the equilibrium is exactly as in Case 1.
The value function for the entrepreneurs is still the one described in (13) while the value
function for the worker becomes
V s
￿ (￿) = w ￿ ￿(w ￿ ^ w) + ￿V s
￿ (￿)F(￿
￿
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￿)] (17)
Again the e￿ect of an increase in the top marginal tax rate is summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 With a progressive tax schedule when the marginal entrepreneur earns more
than the top marginal tax rate bracket but less than the average worker, the e￿ect of an
increase in the top marginal tax rate on entrepreneurial activity is uncertain.
Proof. See Appendix.
As in previous case the e￿ect of an increase in the top marginal tax rate is uncertain. The
reason is similar. The opposite e￿ects on ￿
￿
￿ described above are still at work: an increase in
16the top marginal tax rate decreases both the value of being an entrepreneur (which should
increase the reservation entrepreneurial idea) and the value of being a worker (which should
decrease the reservation entrepreneurial idea). The only di￿erence is that the value of being
a worker decreases more than in the previous case; this time it is not only the decrease in
the option value of searching for a new idea that pushes down the value of being a worker
but also a decrease in earnings associated with higher taxation.
As before, the ￿nal e￿ect of an increase in tax rates on entrepreneurial activity depends
on the distribution of the thetas and on the relative positions of ￿
￿
￿ and ^ ￿. Without any
further assumptions on the value of the parameters, we cannot predict how ￿
￿
￿ changes with




The three cases just discussed suggest that the e￿ect of an increase in the top marginal
tax rate depends on the position of the marginal entrepreneur. If the income of the marginal
entrepreneur is not directly a￿ected by the change in tax rates then an increase in marginal
tax rates will undoubtedly lead to an increase in entrepreneurial activity and a decrease in
the average quality of ￿rms. The reason for this result is that \success taxes" will decrease
the value of waiting for a better idea, so that some people will settle down for lower quality
ideas. If the income of the marginal entrepreneur instead is the top bracket then the ￿nal
result depends on the relative strength of two opposite e￿ects. On the one hand there is the
decrease in the option value of being a worker; on the other hand there is the decrease in the
earnings of the marginal entrepreneur which will cause only those with better entrepreneurial
ideas to become entrepreneurs.
Some of our results, such as the reduction in average quality of entrepreneurial ￿rms
and the entry of lower quality entrepreneurs following an increase in progressive taxes, hinge
on the \persistent" nature of the entrepreneur’s business idea once the entry decision has
17been made. If we instead assume that each period not only the workers but also existing
entrepreneurs can receive a new entrepreneurial idea, the e￿ect of higher taxes, proportional
or progressive, will depend on the correlation of ideas across time. We work out the details
of this modi￿cation in the Appendix.
3.3 Empirical Implications
With taxes some individuals that otherwise would aim for high quality ideas enter self-
employment earlier. Since progressive taxes compress the return to ideas, the minimum
quality of a business idea worth pursuing decreases. Because high marginal taxes reduce the
private value of top quality projects, potential entrepreneurs may settle for medium quality
business projects rather than pursuing the small chance of a brilliant idea in the future.
The individual welfare e￿ect of taxes is negative, since it leads to a distorted choice be-
tween search and entry and reduces quality. However the societal welfare implications may
be even more important, if we believe that high quality entrepreneurial ideas are dispropor-
tionally important, for example for technological progress. Economists such as Nordhaus
(2004) and Kaplan et al. (2009) estimate that entrepreneurs only capture a small fraction
of the surplus they create, which may be even more true for very important innovations.
From an empirical standpoint, measuring the impact of taxation on entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and quality of the ￿rms in particular is a di￿cult task, due both to a lack of data on
entrepreneurial quality and the absence of reliable policy experiments. The evidence pre-
sented here should therefore be viewed as suggestive, rather than de￿nitive. We ￿rst discuss
the evidence provided by other articles, then discuss the results we obtain by using the data
collected by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, the World Bank and Eurostat.
Sanandaji (2010) measures high quality entrepreneurship as billionaires who become rich
18through founding their own ￿rms. Relying on the Forbes list of billionaires and investigating
their source of wealth, he identi￿ed 996 billionaire entrepreneurs in 53 countries. Lower
quality entrepreneurship is measured as non-agricultural self-employment. He ￿nds that high
and low quality entrepreneurship are negatively correlated, with a statistically signi￿cant
negative relationship both in OECD-countries and in a broader sample of Nations. Countries
with higher rates of self-employment tend to have lower per capita numbers of billionaire
entrepreneurs. More importantly, high taxes on ￿rms are negatively correlated with high-
quality entrepreneurship and positively related to self-employment. The latter result is in
line with the idea proposed in this article that higher marginal taxes might increase the
number of entrepreneurs but decrease their quality.
Another empirical study ￿nds results which correspond strongly with the theoretical
predictions in this paper. Kneller and McGowan (2011) study the e￿ect of a change in
marginal corporate taxes in advanced economies. They suggest that the e￿ect of an increase
in taxes depends on the income bracket at which the tax change occurs. Increases in marginal
tax rates applied at low income levels negatively a￿ect entry, while the opposite is true when
the change happens at higher income levels. These empirical ￿ndings can be interpreted in
light of our model. Tax increases on top earners likely apply to income brackets well above
the one where the marginal entrepreneur is located. In this case proposition (3) suggests
that the e￿ect on the entrepreneurial entry rate from tax increases should be positive. This
counterintuitive result (from the point of view of the standard model) is precisely what
Kneller and McGowan ￿nd. When the change in the marginal rate is at lower levels it is
more likely that it is directly a￿ecting the earnings of the marginal entrepreneurs. In this
case propositions (4) and (5) suggest that the e￿ect is indetermined and depends on the
distribution of entrepreneurial talent and the relative distance between the income of the
marginal entrepreneur and the income level at which the change is taking e￿ect. Kneller
19and McGowan ￿nd that the e￿ect on entrepreneurial entry of an increase in marginal tax
rates at lower income levels is negative. It seems that the direct e￿ect on the income of
the entrepreneurs is stronger than the indirect e￿ect on their search option. Kneller and
McGowan (2011) do not investigate the quality of entrepreneurial ￿rms.
We now discuss some additional empirical evidence. In particular we present two sets
of data; the ￿rst combines data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and the
World Bank; the second, uses information obtained from Eurostat and the World Bank.
For the ￿rst empirical exercise we rely on data on high and low-quality entrepreneurship as
measured by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The GEM \Total Entrepreneurial
Activity rate" (TEA) is one of the most widely used measures of entrepreneurship and self-
employment (e.g. Bygrave et al. 2001, Acs and Szerb 2009, Ardagna and Lusardi 2010,
Lerner 2009). The Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate estimates \the Percentage of 18-64
population who are either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business".
Though it includes both high and low quality entrepreneurs, as an empirical matter the
overwhelming majority of start-ups are small scale, in the sense of having very few employees
and low growth ambitions. For instance, several years after startup over 90% of American
new ventures were either out of business or still had fewer than 5 employees. (Sanandaji
2010). Hurst and Pugsley (2011) moreover suggest that most small ￿rms have no interest in
growing or producing signi￿cant innovations.
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor also collects a measure of entrepreneurship that
better corresponds with high quality entrepreneurs, so called \High-Growth Established
Entrepreneurs" (Aotio 2007). This refers to the share of owner-managers of ￿rms that are
at least 42 months old and have at least 20 employees. The GEM also provides data for the
share of established businesses who have 20 or more employees.
20We will use the Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate as a proxy for low quality en-
trepreneurship and the High-Growth Established Entrepreneurs rate as a proxy for high
quality entrepreneurship. Another closely related measure of high-quality entrepreneurship
is the share of business-owners who employ 20 or more employees.
Measuring the quality of ￿rms is not the only challenge. We also need to summarize the
progressivity of the tax code for each country in one rate. Generally, entrepreneurs pay many
di￿erent taxes, with the tax rate depending on the earnings of the ￿rm. Fortunately the
World Bank reports data on the highest marginal tax rate faced by ￿rms for most countries of
the world. This is not a perfect measure of the top marginal tax rate faced by entrepreneurs,
as many business owners are taxed as employees. However in many countries ￿rms, and in
particular successful ￿rms are subject to this tax rate. Furthermore, the highest marginal tax
rate on ￿rms tends to be positively correlated with the level and progressivity of taxation in
general. Some or all data on entrepreneurship and data on taxes is available for 72 countries,
which are a mix of high, middle and low income countries.
Our ￿rst ￿ndings are illustrated in ￿gures (5), (6) and (7). Countries with a high marginal
tax rate on ￿rms have a smaller share of the working age population that are high quality
entrepreneurs (the relationship is statistically signi￿cant at a p-value of 0.07). By contrast,
countries with high top marginal tax rates tend to have a higher number of low quality
entrepreneurs (p-value 0.04). Lastly the share of business owners who employ at least 20
workers is lower in countries with high top marginal tax rates (p-value 0.09). All these results
are robust to controlling for per-capita income, although the p-value increases to 0.12 for
the number of high-quality ￿rms and 0.13 for the share of high-quality ￿rms. The small size
of the sample should be taken into account when interpreting these p-values.
Another way to approximate for the quality of entrepreneurship is the education level of
21entrepreneurs. In order to better correspond with entrepreneurship theory we will use data
on self-employed individuals with at least one employee (other than the business owner), as
provided by Eurostat. For the United States, where such data is not readily available, we
discuss incorporated ￿rms. The incorporated self-employed are much more likely to have
employees than unincorporated ￿rms, two thirds of which have zero employees in the United
States (Sanandaji 2010).
The United States tend to have business owners that are more educated than the overall
workforce; in Western Europe, characterized by a higher average tax rate, the education
of the self-employed is no di￿erent than employees. In 2009 48% of the incorporated self-
employed in the U.S. had tertiary education, compared to 34%of the U.S. workforce. Mean-
while merely 4% of incorporated self-employed lacked high school degrees, compared to 9%
in the entire workforce. The rate of incorporated self-employment was 5.6% among those
with tertiary education and only 1.7% among those with less than a high school degree;
hence the ratio of the self-employment rate of those with more education to those with less
was 3,25.
In Western Europe by contrast those with tertiary education were approximately as likely
to be self-employed (with employees) as those who lack high school degrees, with the ratio
of the self-employment rate in the two groups at 1.06. In Sweden, Norway and several other
high tax countries the ratio is lower than one, so that the highly educated are less likely than
those with little education to be entrepreneurs4.
We include as entrepreneurs only those with at least one employee other than the business
owner herself. In part to account for di￿erences in education levels between countries, we
4The American data is from Hipple (2010) while the European data is from the Eurostat database. The
U.S. data refers to individuals older than 25, while the data from Eurostat is for those between 20-64 years
old.
22compare the self-employment rate of those with tertiary education with the self-employment
rate of those without high school degrees. The ratio of the two rates is a measure of (relative)
entrepreneurial quality. Figure (8) relates this measure of the quality of entrepreneurship
with the highest corporate tax rate in 31 European countries.
The highest marginal tax rate of ￿rms is negatively correlated with the relative quality
of entrepreneurship. On average countries with high tax rates tend to have lower self-
employment rate among the most educated compared to those with little education. Patterns
presented in ￿gure (8) are another indication that highly taxed countries tend to have a lower
quality entrepreneurs but not necessarily fewer entrepreneurs overall. We should again point
out that these results are by nature suggestive. Even if the relationship between taxes
and entrepreneurial quality is interpreted as causal, the mechanism which causes it may
be di￿erent than the one outlined in our model. There are other possible reasons why
countries with high marginal taxes would have more entrepreneurs but of lower quality,
such as tax evasion. Another possible explanation is that high taxes shift the distribution
of entrepreneurs from those motivated in pecuniary rewards to those with non-pecuniary
motivation. Non-pecuniary bene￿ts of self-employment have recently been emphasized by
Hurst and Pugsley (2011). These include being one’s own boss, \hobby"-entrepreneurship
and greater ￿exibility over hours, which is especially important for women. Needless to say
non-pecuniary bene￿ts are not subject to taxes. Higher taxes could therefore cause a higher
share of the self-employed in a country to consist of entrepreneurs who are less interested in
growth and in earning pro￿ts, rather than in fewer entrepreneurs.
When relying on cross-country evidence the risk is always present that the relationships
are not causal, and instead the results of omitted variables, such regulations or the rate of
other taxes. While the data does not allow us to establishing a clear causal relationship,
23the empirical patterns observed across countries are consistent with the theory proposed,
as high marginal tax rates are associated with more entrepreneurs, but of lower average
quality. While far from causal the correlations reported suggest that empirical evaluations
of the relationship between taxes and entrepreneurship need to take the quality margin into
account.
4 The E￿ect of Taxes on Entrepreneurial E￿ort
A second component of the quality of entrepreneurial ￿rms focuses on the level of e￿ort
entrepreneurs exert in their ￿rms. For any given level of entrepreneurial idea ￿rm value
increases because of the entrepreneur’s hard work (this can be interpreted broadly, both
including more hours or higher intensity). When incorporating this margin in our model
we consider the version where both the entrepreneurs and the workers receive a new en-
trepreneurial idea every period. We also introduce a modi￿cation to the search problem,
by introducing a cost for seeking new ideas. Agents who do not work in a ￿rm and instead
choose to search for an entrepreneurial idea pay a ￿xed search cost, b > 0, as opposed to the
previous cases where they earned wages. This ensures that there are indeed two di￿erent
levels of optimal e￿ort (with no search cost and a positive wage the entrepreneurs will only
either choose high e￿ort or remain employed. With no wage and no search cost the agent
will work when ￿ is low, will be indi￿erent between high and low e￿ort at one threshold
point and choose high e￿ort above this point)
Entrepreneurial e￿ort will enter the production function of the entrepreneur, Y e
t = ￿t￿t
and their utility function u(ct) = ￿t￿t ￿ ￿￿t, where ￿t is the e￿ort and ￿ a parameter that
captures the marginal disutility from e￿ort. In particular we assume that there are only
two possible levels of e￿ort, low e￿ort ￿‘ and high e￿ort, ￿h where ￿h > ￿‘ > 0. With these
24modi￿cations we proceed to the calculations of the equilibrium of the model.
4.1 Modi￿ed Model and Equilibrium
The problem for the entrepreneur can be written in a recursive form:




where V s(￿) is the value function for the entrepreneur who is searching for a better en-
trepreneurial idea, V h(￿) is the value function for the entrepreneur who decides to exert high
e￿ort and V l(￿) is the value function for the entrepreneur who exerts low e￿ort.
Using the information in the previous section we can write:
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Notice that V h(￿) and V ‘(￿) are strictly increasing in ￿h and ￿l while V s(￿) is a constant.
In this version of the model the equilibrium will be completely described by two levels
of entrepreneurial ideas. Let’s call ￿1 the level of entrepreneurial idea such that for any
￿ smaller than ￿1 it it’s optimal to pay the ￿xed cost and search for a better idea. The
entrepreneurial idea ￿2 instead is de￿ned as threshold that makes the individual indi￿erent
between exerting high or low e￿ort. Notice that by monotonicity of V h(￿) and V l(￿), for
25all ￿ greater than ￿2 it is optimal to exert high e￿ort rather than low. These two threshold
levels are de￿ned formally as follows:
￿1 : inff￿ : V
s(￿) = V
i(￿)g i = h;‘
￿2 : f￿ : V
‘(￿) = V
h(￿)g
Given the continuity and monotonicity of the three value functions, the su￿cient condi-




Existence and uniqueness of ￿2 is guaranteed by the assumptions on the e￿ort level,
￿h > ￿‘ > 0, and by the monotonicity of V h(￿) and V ‘(￿).










=) ￿2 = ￿
With simple algebra one ￿nds (as expected) that ￿2 > ￿1: The policy function, h(￿); can
then be summarized as follows
26h(￿) = search if ￿ 2 [￿l;￿1)
= ￿‘ if ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2) (23)
= ￿h if ￿ 2 [￿2;￿h]
4.2 Proportional Taxes
As usual we consider the e￿ect of both proportional and progressive taxes on business income.
Let’s start with a proportional tax rate on ￿rm’s pro￿ts. Equation (20) does not change while
(18) and (19) are re-written as:
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and the new policy function is
27h￿(￿) = search if ￿ 2 [￿l;￿
￿
1) (28)





= ￿h if ￿ 2 [￿
￿
2;￿h]
Since (1 ￿ ￿) < 1 we ￿nd that both ￿
￿
1 > ￿1 and ￿
￿
2 > ￿2. Due to taxes fewer people
will become entrepreneurs and fewer of those that become entrepreneurs will exert high








1 > ￿2 ￿ ￿1: This is
an interesting ￿nding with a clear-cut empirical prediction: taxes will not only reduce the
absolute number of entrepreneurs with high e￿ort, but also lead to a reduction of the high
e￿ort type as a share of self-employed. Figure 4 depicts the e￿ect of proportional taxes.
4.3 Progressive Taxes
We will consider the same tax schedule as in (10) and (11), distinguishing three di￿erent cases
as before. Since in this framework the workers and entrepreneurs have the same option value
of waiting, the e￿ect of progressive taxes will be similar to those of proportional taxes (note
that the models exclude tax distortions in the choice of leisure). The di￿erence between
progressive and proportional taxes depends on the income level at which the higher tax
bracket kicks in. With proportional taxes both equilibrium points always change. With
progressive taxes, depending on the level of the bracket, both, one or none of the equilibria
may be a￿ected.
Let us start by rewriting the value functions for the entrepreneurs. They are as follows:
V
h
￿ (￿) = ￿￿h ￿ ￿￿h + ￿
Z
￿
V (￿)dF(￿) for ￿ < ^ ￿ (29)
= ￿￿h ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ^ ￿)￿h ￿ ￿￿h + ￿
Z
￿
V (￿)dF(￿) for ￿ > ^ ￿
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‘
￿ (￿) = ￿￿‘ ￿ ￿￿‘ + ￿
Z
￿
V (￿)dF(￿) for ￿ < ^ ￿ (30)
= ￿￿‘ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ^ ￿)￿‘ ￿ ￿￿‘ + ￿
Z
￿
V (￿)dF(￿) for ￿ > ^ ￿
4.3.1 Case 1: ^ ￿ > ￿2
When the increase in the tax rate starts at a bracket above ￿2 nothing happens to the
equilibrium. Both equilibrium points are below the threshold and none of them changes
because of taxes.
4.3.2 Case 2: ￿2 > ^ ￿ > ￿1
In this case only ￿2 changes. ￿
￿
2 is de￿ned by V h





￿ ￿ ￿^ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
(31)
and with simple algebra one can prove that ￿
￿
2 > ￿2: The e￿ect of progressive taxes is
to decrease the number of entrepreneurs that exert high e￿ort (both as proportion of all
entrepreneurs and in absolute terms).
4.3.3 Case 3: ￿1 > ^ ￿
In this case both ￿1 and ￿2 change. ￿1 will be de￿ned by V s
￿ (￿) = V ‘
￿ (￿) and ￿2 by V h
￿ (￿) =
V ‘








1 to be positive we require ￿￿‘ ￿￿^ ￿￿‘ ￿b > 0 . This last condition also insures that
￿
￿








1 > ￿2 ￿￿1. Once
again the e￿ect of taxation is to decrease the number of entrepreneurs in the economy and
to reduce the absolute number as well as share of hard working business owners.
Some ￿rms that could have been successful do only moderately well in a high tax envi-
ronment because of reduced e￿ort. Taxes lead to fewer ￿rms, a smaller total number of high
e￿ort type, and also a reduction in the share of ￿rms where the owners exert high e￿ort.
These results are intuitive. For entrepreneurial ￿rms to be successful it is generally needed
that the owner works hard in developing the ￿rm. It is a common result across countries
that the self-employed tend to work more hours than the employed. The relation between
e￿ort and ￿rm success has been empirically demonstrated by Bitler et al. (2005).
5 Conclusions
We study the e￿ect of taxes on entrepreneurial entry in a dynamic setting that takes into
account both the number of entrepreneurs and the quality of their ￿rms. A novel ￿nding
is that when entry is associated with an opportunity cost in terms of searching for better
ideas, progressive taxes can decrease the average quality of startups while increasing their
number. Progressive taxes compress the returns to entrepreneurial activity, thus lowering
the reward of the high quality ideas relative to mediocre ones. While the paper focuses on
entrepreneurship, the model can be interpreted as the impact of taxes on any investment
choice which involves taking irreversible decisions at the cost of pursuing better options.
In various speci￿cations higher taxes are found to reduce high quality entrepreneurship,
but may at the same time increase the number of new (lower quality) entrants. Empirical
30studies typically do not take into account the quality of entrepreneurship, and mainly focus on
quantity measures, such as the probability of entry. Since we show that quality and quantity
can go in opposite directions as a result of higher marginal taxes, this standard empirical
framework risks leading to misguided policy conclusions. The result that high marginal taxes
leave unchanged or encourage entrepreneurial entry should not be interpreted as a sign of
small distortions, if quality is not taken into account. This is especially true if the value of
entrepreneurship from a social welfare perspective mainly comes from high quality ventures
and innovations.
When allowing for the choice of e￿ort as well as entry decision we ￿nd that taxes both
discourage entry and reduce entrepreneurial e￿ort. Also in this setting we ￿nd that taxes
impact both the quantity and the quality of entrepreneurship, so that the study of entry
alone would again underestimate the distortion caused by taxation.
Taxes can lead to a larger share of self-employed but less entrepreneurial quality through
other mechanisms as well. For example, the self-employed have an easier time evading taxes,
so taxes can directly discourage the pursuit of entrepreneurial ideas, while encouraging self-
employment motivated by tax evasion only. Clearly the later type of entrepreneur is hardly
the same economic entity as a new ￿rm based on innovative ideas. Studies that point to these
opposing e￿ects of taxes and argue that taxes have ambiguous impact on entrepreneurship
miss an important point. Self-employment and entrepreneurship are not ends to themselves;
they are sought after by policy makers because they are thought to increase economic growth
and help create high paying jobs. Even if higher taxes lead to the swelling of the ranks
of the self-employed encouraging the creation of many small stagnant ￿rms, they are still
detrimental to the economy because they sti￿e productive and fast growing entrepreneurial
ventures.
31Taxes can impact quality di￿erently than quantity in more subtle ways. Monetary in-
come is not the only reward from entrepreneurship; many individuals with have preferences
conducive to entrepreneurship, such as a wish for independence. In a low taxes environment
these individuals are strongly rewarded if they create successful ￿rms and if they choose to
grow. In countries with high taxes many of these individuals may nevertheless pursue the
entrepreneurial lifestyle but because of dulled economic incentives choose \comfort" in their
business rather than risk, competition and expansion. The latter countries might have the
same quantity of entrepreneurs as the former but end up with lower quality entrepreneurship
and disparate economic outcomes.
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36Appendix
A Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Given that both the RHS and the LHS of equation (6) are continuous functions of ￿
￿,
su￿cient conditions for existence of an equilibrium are:
w >
￿l(1 + ￿p) ￿ ￿E(￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)
w < ￿
h
These conditions describe a relationship between the market wage and the distribution
of the quality of entrepreneurial projects. The second condition simply says that the best
possible entrepreneurial idea must yield a return higher than the market wage. The ￿rst
condition says that the wage rate should not be inferior to a quantity that depends on the
distribution of entrepreneurial projects. It is positively related to the lowest entrepreneurial
project and negatively related to the average entrepreneurial project. Intuitively if the lowest
entrepreneurial project increases, then market wage should generally be higher. However if
the lowest bound on the distribution increases the average value of entrepreneurial ideas also
increases, counteracting the ￿rst e￿ect. Generally the e￿ect depends on the particular form
of the distribution. To get a sense of how strict this requirement is consider the following.
Since the thetas are de￿ned over a positive intervale we can normalize , without loss of
generality ￿l = 0: In this case the ￿rst condition simply says that the wage has to be greater
than some negative number. Since the wage is non-negative by de￿nition this is not a strict
requirement.
Nothing in the structure of the problem ensures a unique solution to equation (6). Since
37the LHS of the equation is decreasing in ￿














This condition clearly imposes some restrictions on the shape of the distribution function
of thetas that depend on the value of the parameters ￿ and p.
In our problem multiplicity of equilibria arises from the fact that agents can follow several
internally consistent decision rules. Having a decision rule over decision rules will eliminate
the multiplicity problem. One such decision rule is the following:
￿
￿ = maxf￿ 2 [￿l;￿h] : V
s(￿) = V
e(￿)g
This decision rule generates the highest utillity (discounted pro￿t). Suppose there is more
than one solution to equation (6), so that di￿erent decision rules are available to the agent.














Notice that V e(￿
￿) is an increasing function of ￿
￿; it follows that V e(￿
￿
1) < V e(￿
￿
2) < ::: <
V e(￿
￿
n): Morever since ￿
￿
i for i = 1;:::;n are de￿ned as those points that equate the value of
search and the value of entrepreneurship, it has to be the case that V S(￿
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Let’s de￿ne V e(￿j￿
￿
i) and V s(￿j￿
￿
i) as the value functions for the entrepreneur and the
worker when the agent chooses the ￿
￿
i as his decision rule. Then Vi(￿
￿





is the value function for the agent when using decision rule ￿
￿
i.




j then V s(￿j￿
￿
i) > V s(￿j￿
￿
j); hence from equation (3)
we see that V e(￿j￿
￿
i) > V e(￿j￿
￿









j. We conclude that the agent will choose the decision rule that will give him at least
as much utility as the others. Notice however that di￿erent ￿
￿ imply that the agent will
38choose to become an entrepreneur with di￿erent probabilities each period. In particular, the
higher is ￿
￿ the longer the wait to become an entrepreneur (and enjoy the higher income
guaranteed by it). It is possible that an impatient agent will choose to choose a lower ￿
￿ in
order to enjoy sooner the income guaranteed by entrepreneurship. We do not address this
issue.
39B Proofs of Propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2







(1 ￿ F(x))dx ￿ [(1 ￿ F(b))b ￿ (1 ￿ F(a))a]























￿w(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p))













￿ ￿dF(￿) + ￿
￿
￿ [1 + ￿p ￿ ￿F(￿
￿
￿)]





[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)](1 ￿ ￿w)w
(1 ￿ ￿￿)




B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
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40B.3 Proof of proposition 4
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the sign of this derivative is not certain and depends on the relative position of ^ ￿ and ￿
￿
￿.




B.4 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Once again we can calculate the derivative of ￿
￿
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(^ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
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￿ [1 ￿ F(￿￿
￿)]
￿
the sign of this derivative is not certain.
41C Searching for New Ideas Each Period
Here we modify the assumption that the decision to become an entrepreneur precludes search
for new ideas. Some of the results from the previous section depend on the assumption of
irreversible investment. In order to illustrate the importance of this assumption we consider
the other extreme, that each period the old idea has run its course and there is a search
for a new idea. We should emphasize we do consider this case because we believe it to be
realistic rather it is done to illustrate a property of the previous model. There is no longer
an alternative cost in terms of searching for new ideas when choosing self-employment. We
maintain all the other assumptions, including the important assumption that the ￿ are not
correlated over time.
We keep, when possibile, the same notation. The problem can be rewritten as














It is straightforward from this formulation to conclude that ￿
￿ = w and that for all ￿ < ￿
￿,
V e(￿) < V s(￿) and for all ￿ > ￿
￿, V e(￿) > V s(￿):
42C.1 Proportional Taxes
As before we consider taxation on business and labor income and we distinguish between
proportional and progressive taxes. Again, proportional taxes do not have any e￿ect if the
tax rate on labor and business income are the same. If they are di￿erent the equilibrium







From expression (34) it is possible to see that if ￿w > ￿￿ then ￿
￿
￿ > ￿
￿ and vice versa
and that ￿
￿
￿ is decreasing in ￿w and increasing in ￿￿. These results are identical to those
obtained with persistent entrepreneurial ideas.
C.2 Progressive Taxes
Consider the tax schedules described in (10) and (11) and consider two cases. The case with
￿
￿ > ^ ￿ > w is no longer available since in this case ￿
￿ = w:
C.2.1 Case A: ^ ￿ > ￿
￿ = w
The income level at which the tax rate increases from zero is higher than the equilibrium
entrepreneurial entry level. As shown in the previous section, in this case the only e￿ect of
a change in the top marginal tax rate will be a change in the option value of waiting for
a better entrepreneurial. However now both workers and the entrepreneurs have the same
option: both of them will receive a new entrepreneurial idea unlike the previous case when
only workers could receive another entrepreneurial idea while entrepreneurs were tied to their
current project.
43Clearly the change in the option value will be the same for both types and a change in the
top marginal tax rates will not have any impact on the entry threshold into entrepreneurship.
More precisely, the value function for the worker and the entrepreneur can be re-written as:
V
s
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Z
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V (￿)dF(￿) for ￿ < ^ ￿ (36)
= ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ^ ￿) + ￿
Z
￿
V (￿)dF(￿) for ￿ ￿ ^ ￿
and is clear that ￿
￿




so that taxes do not a￿ect the optimal level of entry. The option value is the same for
the entrepreneur and the worker; the mechanism that previously caused ￿
￿
￿ to decrease with
taxes is absent now.
C.2.2 Case B: ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ = w
The value function for the entrepreneur stays as in (36), while the one for the worker can be
re-written as:
V










This result should not be surprising. As seen in previous section there are two mechanisms
at work when ^ ￿ < ￿
￿: The ￿rst mechanism is the change in the option value described above.
We now know that since the option value is the same for both the entrepreneur and the
worker there should be no change coming through that channel. Moreover since wage and
entrepreneurial income are taxed now at the same rate (the top marginal rate), any change
will a￿ect both sources of income in the same way; this changes the value of being an
entrepreneur and the value of being a worker in the same way resulting in no change in the
optimal threshold/decision rule.
C.3 Interpretation
The previous section demonstrates the importance of our assumption about the level of
commitment associated with the entrepreneurial project.
When the entrepreneurial ideas that agents discover each period are not correlated over
time neither proportional nor progressive taxes will a￿ect optimal entrepreneurial entry
through the mechanisms proposed in this model5. Our assumption about the possibility
of changing one’s project once the ￿rm is created is simply a particular case where en-
trepreneurial ideas (the value of the innovation or ￿rm) are perfectly correlated over time.
This suggests that in the case of positive but imperfect correlation over time the e￿ect of
taxation on the option value will be di￿erent for the worker and for those that are already
self-employed.
5There are of course other mechanisms through which taxes can be important, such as distorting the
choice between leisure and work or smoothing risks.
45In particular since entrepreneurs tend to be those agents with high ￿
0s and workers
generally those with lower ￿
0s the direction of the e￿ect of taxation on the option value of
searching for new ideas will be the one illustrated in previous section, albeit if not as strong
in intensity. In practice the choice to enter with one idea is not irreversible, but involves
some alternative value in terms of other perhaps better innovations or business ideas.
46D Figures
Figure 1: Graphical representation of a decision rule, ￿
￿. All individuals with an unobserv-
able entrepreneurial idea, ￿; above the threshold, ￿
￿; will choose to become entrepreneurs.
The others will decide to be workers and wait for next period entrepreneurial draw. En-
trepreneurial income has a kink because of the progressive nature of taxation. The graph
illustrates the case where ^ ￿ > ￿
￿:
47Figure 2: This ￿gure shows the e￿ect of an increase in the top marginal tax rate on the quality
of entrepreneurial ￿rms through a change in the option value of searching for better ideas.
The threshold decreases as the value of waiting for a good entrepreneurial idea decreases.
An increase in the top marginal tax rate decreases the workers’ option value as the best
ideas will be taxed more heavily; this will prompt more individuals to join the ranks of the
entrepreneurs with lower quality ￿rms. This happens irrespective of the relative position of
^ ￿ and ￿
￿. Here we draw the case when ^ ￿ > ￿
￿:
48Figure 3: This ￿gure shows the direct e￿ect of an increase in the top marginal tax rate
on the threshold for entrepreneurial activity. The threshold increases as the value of each
entrepreneurial idea decreases vis-a-vis market wage. This only happens when ^ ￿ > ￿
￿.
However there is a counterbalancing e￿ect (not shown in this picture) resulting from the
decrease in the value of being a worker and waiting for a good entrepreneurial idea, as
illustrated in previous picture. In this case the total e￿ect is indeterminate.
49Figure 4: This ￿gure shows the e￿ect of an increase in proportional taxes on the value of
entrepreneurial ￿rms. The shaded area represents the welfare loss for the entrepreneurs.
50Figure 5: The Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) refers to \the highest rate shown
on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations". It is calculated
by the authors using the World Bank data. The year 2009 or the latest available year is
used. Total new business activity refers to the standard Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
measure, Total Early State Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), which is \the Percentage of 18-
64 population who are either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business".
Nascent entrepreneurs are in turn those actively involved in setting up a business they will
own or co-own. The ￿gure refers to the average of years 2001-2009, as calculated by authors
using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Database.
51Figure 6: The Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) refers to \the highest rate shown
on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations". It is calculated
by the authors using the World Bank data. The World Bank in turn based the measure
on KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009, and PricewaterhouseCoopers’s
Worldwide Tax Summaries Online. The year 2009 or the latest available year is used. High-
Quality Entrepreneurs refers to the share of working age population that are business owners
and have at least 20 employees. The ￿gure refers to the average of the years 2000-2006.
52Figure 7: The Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) refers to \the highest rate shown
on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations". It is calculated
by the authors using the World Bank data. The World Bank in turn based the measure
on KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009, and PricewaterhouseCoopers’s
Worldwide Tax Summaries Online. The year 2009 or the latest available year is used. High-
Quality Entrepreneurs refers to the percent of ￿rms that have at least 20 employees. The
￿gure refers to the average of the years 2000-2006.
53Figure 8: The Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) refers to \the highest rate shown
on the schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations". It is calculated
by the authors using the World Bank data. The World Bank in turn based the measure
on KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009, and PricewaterhouseCoopers’s
Worldwide Tax Summaries Online. The year 2009 or the latest available year is used. \The
Ratio of Self-employment of educated and non-educated" refers to the share of individuals
with tertiary degrees who are self-employed with employees divided by the share of individ-
uals with less than upper-secondary education who are self-employed with employees. Data
is from Eurostat 2010 for 31 European countries, age group 20-64.
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